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Research in several domains has shown that the implementation of computerized 
decision support aids is often associated with issues of human-automation interaction, 
which can have disastrous consequences.  One often-cited reason for these issues is the 
poor quality of the feedback that is provided to the operators through these tools. The 
objective of the proposed investigation is to examine how providing feedback through a 
decision support tool affects operator knowledge and performance in the context of a 
fault management task for naval gunfire support.  
 A one-way between-groups comparison was made to investigate differences 
between providing decision support feedback (logic trace, mission impact, both, no 
feedback) in a fault management task.  Logic trace feedback was posited to provide users 
with a representation of the logic that the decision support tool used in reaching a 
conclusion about the best course of action to perform and is posited to support better 
diagnostic performance.  Mission impact feedback was posited to provide the operator 
with a description of the potential effects that a taking a course of action will have on the 
pre-planned mission and is expected to support better prognoses of the outcome of a 
particular fault.  Finally, providing both feedback types was posited to support better 
compensatory actions for fault situations.  Results indicated that decision support 
feedback has potential improve diagnosis and decrease errors of commission in these 
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The United States Navy has recently established the ambitious goal of reducing 
manning on future Navy ships by as much as 75%.  However, while the number of 
individuals aboard ships will certainly be smaller, naval warfare will only become more 
complex.  For example, a new class of naval destroyers with a substantial reduction in 
manning levels will have the capability to perform land attack missions, a capability that 
was not required of previous destroyer classes.  As a result, the operators aboard these 
new vessels, who already routinely operate under high workload, will be asked to 
perform more tasks than had previously been performed.  One potential way of achieving 
these seemingly conflicting goals of reduced manning in a more complex domain is to 
increase the use of automated systems and decision support tools.  However, a substantial 
body of research suggests that there are inherent pitfalls with the introduction of 
automation and decision support, primarily related to the interaction between the human 
and the automated system (Wiener & Curry, 1980; Wiener, 1989; Woods, 1996; Mouloua 
& Koonce, 1997).  Parasuraman and Riley (1997) posit that, although automated systems 
do have potential to support reductions in cognitive and manual workload for operators, 
multiple factors influence the effectiveness of the interaction between the operator and 
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the automated system.  In fact, the added complexity and changing role of the operator in 
many automated systems actually may, in fact, have the opposite of the intended 
consequence of workload reduction on the operator (Sheridan, 1970).  Lee and Moray 
(1996) hypothesize that a complex interaction between factors including operator self-
confidence, system accuracy (see Muir, 1987), perceived workload, and task complexity, 
and operator skill level influence operator reliance on automation.  Parasuraman et al. 
(1997) submit that designers of these systems must consider the consequences on the 
human operator is a critical factor in the design of these systems and that among the risks 
of not making these considerations (abuse) are over-reliance (misuse), under-reliance 
(disuse).  Consequently, it is crucial that we understand how to implement these systems 
such that they provide operators with the required knowledge to use them effectively.   
The interaction between automation and decision support tools and the operator 
who utilizes them hinges primarily on the communication strategy that the designers of 
these tools implements.  In fact, a frequently-cited reason in the literature for human-
automation interaction failures is that the quality of the feedback that is provided to the 
operator is often very poor (Norman, 1990; Sarter & Woods, 1992; Mosier & Skitka, 
1996; Woods, 1996).  The objective of the proposed investigation is to examine how 
providing feedback through a decision support tool may affect operator knowledge and 
performance.  More specifically, this investigation focuses on methods of tailoring 
feedback from a decision support tool to the informational needs of operators at various 
stages in the decision-making process.  For reasons discussed in more detail in following 
sections, this investigation was performed within the context of a military fault 
management decision-making domain, naval gunfire support, in which operators must 
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respond quickly and accurately when there are mechanical faults within gun systems in 
an effort to minimize their impact on a pre-planned land attack mission.  
Any approach to providing decision support should be rooted in an understanding 
of how decision-makers process information within a domain.  The following section 
provides an integrated framework of human information processing for fault management 
tasks and proposes a comparison, based on this framework, between three forms of 
feedback that can be provided by a decision support tool for fault resolution.  
 
Information Processing in Fault Management 
 
Rasmussen’s (1986) ‘decision ladder’ (Figure 1) provides a useful framework 
from which to describe the information processing activities involved in fault 
management.  The decision ladder describes human information processing in response to 
information from the environment.  As the figure illustrates, human behavior can be 
represented as a three level hierarchy.   At the lowest level of the hierarchy is skill-based 
behavior, which is characterized as volitional sensory motor acts, such as tracking tasks, 
for which performance takes place without conscious control.  At the intermediate level, 
rule-based behavior is based on stored rules or procedures selected from previous 
successful experiences in similar situations.  Finally, at the highest level is knowledge-
based behavior or goal-controlled behavior for which no rules are available from previous 
encounters.  At this level, individuals formulate behavioral responses based on the 














Figure 1: Rasmussen’s (1986) Decision Ladder. 
 
 
The decision ladder in Figure 1 depicts the relationship between these levels of 
cognitive control and decision phases.  The boxes in the ladder illustrate the information 
processing activities involved in each decision phase and the circles represent the 
information or knowledge produced, which feed into the next decision phase.  In general, 
data from the environment is observed and cues an evaluation and interpretation of the 
data.  The individual’s response to these environmental cues is formulated and an action 
is executed.  It is well established in the literature that human decision making is often 
characterized by the use of heuristics, or shortcuts to this decision making process (see 























depicted here is a normative model in that it describes what people should do ideally and 
can be used as a frame of reference for fault management.  Many decision support 
applications have been developed based on normative models, such as this (Edwards, 
1987).  More descriptive models of expert decision making strategies may have utility.  
However, they are beyond the scope of this investigation into a basic understanding of 
the feedback needed to support fault diagnosis.  
The decision ladder discussed above can be applied across a variety of situations, 
activities, and decision types.  For the purposes of this investigation, the focus is on fault 
management decision-making.  In fault management, a fault represents an abnormal state 
of the system that has the potential to impact the successful achievement of the mission, 
in this case, the land attack mission.  Rogers, Schutte, and Latorella (1996) describe fault 
management in terms of four operational tasks, or ‘threads of activity’.  These are 
detection, diagnosis, prognosis, and compensation.  Detection involves the recognition 
that an abnormality has occurred and that the operator must intervene in the process.  
Diagnosis is the activity that is performed to determine both the cause of the abnormality 
and the consequences of the failure.  Prognosis is the activity that the operator performs 
to predict future states caused by the fault over time.  Finally, the task of compensation 
utilizes the preceding task to determine the appropriate response to the fault.  As is 
evident from the descriptions above, each of these fault management tasks require the 
operator to perform different information processing activities and each of these activities 
has different knowledge requirements.  
Rogers and his colleagues have mapped each of these functions onto Rasmussen’s 
(1986) “decision ladder’, which depicts the relationship between skill-based, rule based, 
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and knowledge based control and the fault management ‘threads of activity’ described 
above (see Figure 2).  As the figure shows, the operational tasks involved in fault 
management follow a path, which, in the initial operational stages of the fault, relies on 
bottom-up data (e.g., alerts, sensor data, etc.) to detect that there is a problem and to 
begin to diagnose what that problem is.  The operator is then faced with the challenge of 
evaluating and interpreting the data so that he or she may perform the necessary 
compensatory actions.  Key decisions are made at this point in fault management that 
determine how the operator predicts the impact of the fault on the mission (prognosis) 














Figure 2:  Fault Management Activities Mapped onto Rasmussen’s (1986) Decision 
































 The application of human factors to the design of displays and controls can do 
much to support fault management at the skill-based levels and rule-based levels of 
detection and compensation.  Activity at these levels is, in large part, based on familiar 
situation and internalized routines and rules.  Arguably, it is at the knowledge-based 
processing level, diagnosis and prognosis phases of fault management that decision 












Figure 3:  Rasmussen’s (1986) Knowledge-based Fault Management Activities. 
 
 
 At this level, the situations are non-routine and rules are not available to the 
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during these phases requires considerations of the ambiguity of the data for diagnosing 
and produces a goal for the operator of how to compensate for the fault.  Once the target-
state of the system is determined, the operator can then formulate the necessary tasks and 
procedures to compensate for the fault effectively.     
The following section will focus on the processes that occur at the knowledge-
based level and the information that is necessary, via feedback from a decision support 
tool, to successfully diagnose faults, develop prognoses, and determine compensatory 
actions in fault situations. 
 
Feedback for Fault Management 
 
The models of fault management described above provide insight into the 
information that a decision support tool would need to provide for successful fault 
diagnosis and prognosis.  Figure 3 illustrates the activities that occur and the information 
requirements at the knowledge-based level of the fault management hierarchy.  A 
feedback loop of two information-processing activities occurs at the knowledge-based 
level: evaluation and interpretation.  According to Rasmussen (1986), during the 
evaluation activity, the decision-maker evaluates options and selects a relevant goal.  
During the interpretation activity, the decision-maker predicts the consequences of taking 
an action in terms of the relevant goals and constraints of the mission and the current 
situation.    
Within this loop, the decision-maker generally requires three types of knowledge 
or information.  First, the current system-state is provided by identification of the 
 9
problem during the detection stage and early in the diagnosis stage and serves as input 
into the knowledge-based processing and predicting the consequences of the fault.  The 
two remaining information sources that are required serve as the connections between 
evaluation and interpretation processes and can be provided to assist the operator through 
a decision support tool.   These are (1) information on the mismatch between normal 
operation (ambiguity) and the current systems state and (2) information pertaining to the 
ultimate goal or target state (ultimate goal) of the system.   
The following section will describe the domain of interest for the current 
investigation and a decision support tool designed to assist operators in decisions at the 
knowledge-based level of processing.  This section will provide the context for further 
discussion on the appropriate information needed to support decisions made during both 
the diagnosis and prognosis (knowledge-based) stages in fault management. 
 
Context: Naval Surface Fire Support Domain 
 
Historically, fault management investigation has been performed within the 
context of only a few domains characterized by complex systems consisting of tightly 
coupled physical components.  Examples of these domains include nuclear power, 
process control, and aviation.  However, the utility of fault management theories is not 
limited to these types of physical systems.   The domain of interest in the current study, 
Naval Surface Fire Support, is one example of a system in which fault management 
theories can be applied to investigate what information is required by operators to 
successfully resolve a system fault.   
 10
The task of Naval Surface Fire Support involves firing on land targets within a 
pre-planned mission schedule to provide support for a land attack mission.  Like the 
traditional domains of interest mentioned above, Naval Surface Fire Support consists of 
tightly coupled interacting components.  However, these components can include both 
physical (i.e., mechanical) components such as guns, ammunition, transducers, and 
hydraulic systems as well as other system entities like friendly and enemy troops, aircraft, 
targets, and the gun commander.   Further, Naval Surface Fire Support can be described 
as a process in that the role of the operator is to maintain a preplanned mission schedule 
despite faults that may occur within the system.  Faults, in this case, are abnormal states, 
which threaten the mission schedule.  These faults can include the physical breakdown of 
mechanical components of the guns.   For example, a leaking hydraulic seal within a 
particular gun may render it inoperable for future targets and threaten performance within 
the mission schedule.  System faults can also be brought about by entities within the 
battle.  For example, friendly troops could move into proximity of an active target, 
making firing on a target risky and threatening adherence to the mission schedule.  
Moreover, these faults can interact with one another, as is the case when a particular gun 
problem makes it less accurate and the movement of entities in the environment makes 
accuracy critical to conforming to the mission schedule.  
Not only do the elements of the Naval Surface Fire Support domain map to the 
elements of other domains traditionally studied in fault management tasks, but the 
activities of the operators within this domain are quite similar as well.   Gun commanders 
follow the same ‘threads of activity’ described by Rogers et al. (1996) of detection, 
diagnosis, prognosis, and compensation.  
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 In the current investigation, detection of a mechanical gun fault is a somewhat 
trivial task in that the decision support tool that is used as a testbed alerts the operator 
when it detects one.  Detection of faults involving entities within the battle is a more 
complex task involving visual monitoring of the battlefield and auditory monitoring of a 
communication circuit.  For these entities, the operator must detect when the movement 
of entities like aircraft and troops have the potential to change the firing plan and threaten 
the mission schedule.   
 In the more traditional fault management domains, diagnosis is a process of 
identifying the cause of abnormal states of the system and inferring the consequences of 
that aberration on other physical systems components.  Operators of nuclear power plants 
and pilots of advanced automation aircraft often must identify which of a number of 
potential root causes are the source of a needle deflection and then interpret how the 
responsible component impacts other components.  In contrast, the tasks involved in 
diagnosis of physical faults (gun casualties) in Naval Surface Fire Support faults, are not 
as heavily focused on identifying the cause of the fault.  In fact, for the current 
investigation, this information is explicitly provided to the operator at the detection phase 
when they are alerted to a particular gun problem.  Rather, the focus of diagnosis is more 
on the potential impact of the abnormality on other system components, which, as 
described previously may be either physical components or battle entities.    
 Like prognosis of more traditional fault management domains, the task of 
prognosis in Naval Surface Fire Support involves inferring the consequences of taking an 
action in response to a system fault on the success or failure of the mission.  For example, 
one response to a gun problem may be to cancel firing on a specific target.  However, if 
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that target is high priority and critical to the success of the mission, the operator may 
have to consider other alternatives.   
Finally, the compensation task within the Naval Surface Fire Support domain is 
essentially the same as it is in the more traditional domains.  Once the appropriate course 
of action has been determined, the operator implements the appropriate action.  In the 
majority of cases in the current study, performing this course of action is accomplished 
through selection of an option within the decision support testbed. 
 
Resolution of Ambiguity: Logic Trace Feedback 
 
Figure 3 shows that knowledge that resolves diagnostic ambiguity is a key 
component in the interpretation and evaluation process of fault management tasks.  
Results of several investigations have suggested that providing users with topographical 
information of the interrelationships of system components and failures can provide 
considerable benefit in knowledge-based processing and fault diagnosis. (Rasmussen, 
1986; Kieras, 1992; Edlund & Lewis, 1994; Moore & Corbridge, 1996).  For example, in 
a series of studies, Kieras (1992) obtained significant improvements in performance from 
participants in a malfunction diagnosis task by providing diagrammatic displays of the 
engineered systems.  Kieras and Bovair (1984) made a somewhat similar manipulation in 
the context of training users of a complex device.  Two groups of participants received 
identical training on the procedures to operate a control panel device (rote training) with 
no instruction on the interrelationships between components. In addition, one group 
(model group) also received approximately 15 minutes of ‘model training’ in which flow 
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diagrams and a simple description of how the components of the system interacted were 
presented.  Their results showed that participants in the model group were able to learn a 
novel procedure 28% faster and showed significantly better retention when tested 
subsequently than the rote group.  A major finding of these studies was that providing 
this type of information to participants in the diagnosis task significantly improved the 
quality of diagnoses.   
Rasmussen (1985) suggests that the benefits of providing topographical 
information lie in providing the causal structure to the diagnostician.  Yoon & Hammer 
(1988) propose that there are two further advantages to the use of topographical 
information in decision aiding in fault management.  First, the representation is highly 
understandable to humans.  Second, it provides a decomposition that allows the operator 
to make predictions and reason causally about the system. However, as the problem space 
increases in graphically displayed networks, operators are less able to perform optimally 
on a fault diagnosis task (Rouse, 1978).  For the current investigation, topographical 
information will be provided to operators in a textual form, which provides the user with 
knowledge of which nodes in the process were considered by the decision support tool in 
determining a recommended course of action.  For example, for a particular gun problem 
the feedback would take the following  form:  
Pending target assigned to this mount? Y 
Can pending target be cancelled? N 
Conflicting target? Y  
Is target time sensitive?  N 
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 Feedback in this format would provide operators with a concise logical trace of 
only those decision nodes directly involved in the diagnosis and formulation of the 
recommended course of action for the particular fault.   
 Rogers, Schutte, and Latorella (1996) note that it is generally accepted that 
diagnosis is not only limited to identifying the cause of the failure, but it also 
encompasses the interpretation of the consequences of the system failure on other 
systems.  This is the definition of diagnosis that is used in the current investigation.  In 
fact, the decision support tool that is used in this study correctly and accurately identifies 
the source of the problem for the operator (e.g., hydraulic seal leaking).  The task of the 
operator is to interpret what the problem means in the context of other systems and 
environmental entities (e.g., other guns, the battlefield, targets, friendly forces, low flying 
aircraft, etc.).  For example, transducer damage is a particular gun casualty that degrades 
the accuracy of projectiles.  If this problem arises, but it is not important that projectiles 
are accurate for the target to which the gun is assigned, then transducer damage does not 
represent a problem.  However, if friendly troops are in the vicinity of this target, then the 
importance of being accurate is paramount.  
 
Considering Ultimate Goals: Mission Impact Feedback 
  
A second type of information necessary in the knowledge-based processing level 
of fault management is information, which maps the consequences of following a 
particular compensatory action to the goals of the operator.  This feedback supports 
prognoses by allowing the operator to predict the consequences in terms of the goals and 
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constraints of the mission.  Shraagen (1997) emphasized the importance of providing 
information to predict future states in the development of a decision support tool for 
novice naval damage control (DC) officers.  In a task analysis of both experts and novice 
DC officers, the novice officers were often unable to predict where fires were likely to 
spread aboard ship thus limiting their ability to take preemptive actions.  Feedback, 
which allows operators to understand how their actions will affect future states, should 
always be useful because it would allow operators to understand how the actions that they 
perform now will impact the future and to compare their current goals to the predicted 
future states.  Several researchers have maintained that the feedback provided by 
complex systems should map to the goals and expectations of operators.  For example, 
Endsley (1996) has argued that, for operator situation awareness in automated systems, it 
is important that interfaces provide comprehensible information that maps to the 
operator’s goals.  Woods (1995) further argues that, in order to provide better 
representations to operators of complex systems, it is critical to put data into context of 
larger frames of reference, including the interests and expectations of the user.  For the 
purposes of the current investigation, participants must manage the impact of performing 
a particular course of action in response to a fault on timely performance of the mission.  
Feedback that maps the impact of a particular course of action onto pre-planned mission 
goals should support prognoses by providing the information necessary to evaluate their 




Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the role of feedback generated by 
a decision support tool on the knowledge-based processes in fault diagnosis. The 
normative fault management models of Rasmussen (1986) and Rogers, Smith and 
Latorella (1996) suggest fault managers require topographical information of the cause 
and effect relationships between systems to effectively diagnose faults and information 
on the impact of potential actions on mission goals to make fault prognoses.  Both of 
these forms of information should, according to the models, support better decision-
making, which should result in better compensatory actions in response to system faults. 
A decision support tool for Naval gunfire support, known as the Naval Surface 
Fire Support Assistant (NSFSA), provides a unique opportunity to investigate the impact 
of providing each type of feedback described above, either alone or in combination.  This 
tool was developed under the Office of Naval Research’s Manning Affordability 
Initiative to demonstrate the capability of using a cognitive modeling approach as an 
architecture for a decision support tool.  The iGen™ architecture behind this tool is 
derived from the GOMS (Goals, Operators, Methods, Selection Rules) work of Card, 
Moran, and Newell (1983) and utilizes notations for current problem representation, 
cognitive and behavioral representations of the human/system interaction, and 
representations of perceptual cues in the environment.  A degree of context sensitivity is 
also built into this framework such that the order in which tasks are executed is 
dependent on the internal representation of the problem at a given point in time.   
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Using the iGen™ architecture, the NSFSA decision support tool has the capability 
to provide two types of feedback regarding gun casualties.  First, it provides operators 
with the logic and procedures that were used by the decision support tool to arrive at a 
particular recommendation (logic trace feedback).  The feedback provided to the operator 
can be stated in terms of the trace of logic that the NSFSA traversed to reach particular 
courses of action.  Second, it can provide context specific feedback that elaborates on the 
impact of selecting a course of action in response to a particular gun problem on the 
mission in a reference scenario (mission impact feedback).  This form of feedback can be 
said to map to the operators’ goals in the context of the current state of the mission. .   
 The capability of the NSFSA to furnish operators with either of these two types of 
feedback allows for the investigation of three aspects of the normative models described 
above. First, it allows for the investigation of whether providing logic trace feedback 
supports better diagnoses in fault management.   Second, it provides the opportunity to 
investigate whether mission impact feedback supports the formulation of better 
prognoses.  Finally, it allows for the study of whether providing both forms of feedback 
supports better interpretation and evaluation of the situation, which results in better 
compensation activities.   Thus, the proposed study will compare fault management 
performance for three methods of decision support feedback (logic trace, mission impact, 
both) to determine how they affect knowledge-based processing activities.  The following 








 It was expected that operators receiving either logic trace feedback, mission 
impact, or both types of feedback would perform better on fault management tasks than 
operators receiving only recommended courses of action.  For this investigation, the 
predicted outcome was that operators receiving some additional feedback would make 
either a greater number of correct diagnoses on the effect of a gun casualty on the system 
or a greater number of correct prognoses on the impact of a gun casualty on the 
completion of a pre-planned Naval Surface Fire Support mission scenario in their gun 
casualty reports.  Further, it was predicted that operators receiving no additional feedback 
would be significantly more likely to choose the ‘recommended’ course of action for 
each gun casualty than operators receiving no additional feedback.  Finally, operators 





It was expected that operators receiving logic trace feedback would be better at 
fault diagnosis than operators receiving mission impact feedback only.  For the purposes 
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of this investigation, it was predicted that individuals in the logic trace feedback only 
condition would make a significantly greater number of correct diagnoses in gun casualty 
reports during performance on a Naval Surface Fire Support Mission than individuals 
receiving mission impact feedback only.  Further, it was expected that the participants in 
the logic trace only condition would have significantly more correct answers on the 




It was expected that operators receiving mission impact feedback would provide 
better prognoses of the faults on the mission than operators receiving only logic trace 
feedback.  It was predicted that participants in this group will make a significantly higher 
number of correct reports on the impact of a gun casualty on the completion of a pre-
planned Naval Surface Fire Support mission scenario than individuals receiving logic 
trace feedback only.  Moreover, it was predicted that “mission impact only” participants 





It was expected that operators receiving both logic trace feedback and mission 
impact feedback would be able to better compensate for system faults than operators 
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receiving either mission impact feedback alone or logic trace feedback alone.  In the 
context of the current investigation, it was predicted that participants receiving both 
forms of feedback would make significantly more correct responses to gun casualties in 
the Naval Surface Fire Support scenario in significantly less time than participants 
receiving only one form of feedback.  Finally, it was predicted that the participant 
receiving both forms of feedback would score higher on the compensation section of a 








Sixty participants were recruited from introductory psychology classes at the 
University of Central Florida and chose to either be paid for their participation in this 
investigation or received course credit.  Participants ranged in age from 17 to 31 years 
(median age=21 years) and were evenly split between males (n=30) and females (n=30).  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four feedback conditions (no feedback, 
mission impact feedback, logic trace feedback, or both).  While a more detailed analysis 
of the demographic data will be provided in the results section, it should be mentioned 
here that there were no significant differences between groups in age, class standing, 
computer or video game experience.  There were no restrictions on who was able to 
participate in this investigation.  An a priori rule was put into place that in the unlikely 
event that any participants had a background in naval gunfire support, the data collected 
from these participants would not be used in comparisons.   However, no participants had 
prior experience in the domain. Finally, all participants were treated in accordance with 
ethical guidelines set forth by the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct”  (American Psychological Association, 1992).  Consequently, participants will 




Naval Surface Fire Support Assistant (NSFSA) 
 
Two computer programs were utilized in this investigation.  First was the Naval 
Surface Fire Support Assistant (NSFSA) which was initially developed by CHI Systems 
under the Office of Naval Research Manning Affordability Initiative to demonstrate the 
use of a cognitive modeling technique (iGen™) in the design of automation and decision 
support for future naval systems. The NSFSA is run on a standard personal computer and 
provides users with notifications of gun problems (e.g., hydraulic seals leaking, ammo 
low, etc.) and suggests a prioritized list of potential courses of action (cancel target, 
reallocate target to another gun mount, etc.).  As mentioned previously, the NSFSA can 
provide feedback in two ways.  First, the NSFSA software has been modified so that it 
can provide feedback containing the logic that the model used to arrive at the prioritized 
courses of action (logic trace).  Second, it can provide explanation to the user of the 
impact of potential courses of action on the mission based on the mission schedule and 
target priority (mission impact). .  For example, the explanation of a proposal to 
reallocate a target to another gun mount because a hydraulic seal is leaking might be 
explained to the user as “Reduces disruption to the original target schedule”.  In contrast, 
for the “logic trace” conditions, feedback takes the form of yes/no reports of the logical 
nodes that the NSFSA traversed in arriving at its recommendations. Thus, feedback to 
operators for reallocating a gun mount based on a hydraulic seal leaking took the 
following form:  
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Pending target assigned to this mount? Y 
Can pending target be cancelled? N 
Conflicting target? Y  
Is target time sensitive?  N 
 
 The NSFSA has the capability to provide logic trace feedback, mission impact 
feedback, or both forms of feedback to the operator when a gun casualty occurs.  As an 
experimental testbed the NSFSA collects time-stamped data on each screen element that 
the user clicks on during scenario runs and provides a spreadsheet of user actions for 
analysis of latency and accuracy. 
 
Jane's Fleet Command 
 
The second software package, Jane’s Fleet Command ® (JFC), a commercially 
available war game developed by Sonalysts Corporation, was run concurrently with 
NSFSA during the experiment.  This software provided the actual Naval Gunfire Support 
Scenario on a standard personal computer.  In essence, this is the ‘knowledge of the 
external world’ for the participants and dynamically displays the tactical situation with a 
view of the targets, surface ships and aircraft within the scenario using Naval Tactical 
Data Symbology (NTDS).  Participants had limited control of the JFC software during 
the scenario run.  Control was limited to being able to zoom in and out and pan the 
display for better visibility of events within the scenario.  This was accomplished through 
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commands to the keyboard.  Participants had no control over the movements of displayed 
elements on the screen so that the scenario unfolded in the same way for each participant.  
Jane's Fleet Command and the NSFSA were run synchronously, providing the 




Two subject matter experts, working at the Navair Orlando Training Systems 
Division  developed an approximately one-hour land attack warfare scenario.  This 
scenario simulates some of the tasks that may be required of a gun commander assistant 
onboard a future naval vessel providing surface gunfire support in a land attack mission.  
Participants were responsible for the firing of 2 gun mounts (MT51 and MT52) aboard 
own-ship on 30 ground targets.  Appendix C contains a list of these targets and their 
attributes.  Targets were classified in terms of their type (e.g., armor, command post, 
etc.), the category of target (e.g., accuracy sensitive, start time sensitive, etc.), and 
priority on a 10-point scale (1=low, 10=high).  Each of these targets was to be fired upon 
at a pre-planned time with a given number of rounds.  The participants could alter this 
firing schedule based on the priority and category of target and the current gun problem. 
Within the scenario, participants were confronted with 5 major types of gun 
problems.  Transducer damage negatively impacts the ability of the gun mount to fire 
accurately on targets.  Two problems are associated with the hydraulic seal on the gun 
mount.  A hot hydraulic seal does not in and of itself represent a problem unless 
accompanied by hydraulic seal leaking.  In this case, the gun mount may be damaged and 
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not have the ability to service future targets.  Recoil damage can also negatively impact 
the guns ability to service future targets.  Finally, there may be low ammunition in the 
gun mount, which requires the participant to notify logistics and supply command for 
replenishment.   So, for example, if the NSFSA has identified a problem with a particular 
gun mount, the participant may have to decide whether or not to cancel firing on a target, 
reallocate the target to the other gun mount, or fire until gun failure.  This decision may 
be based upon target category, target priority and the context of the mission as displayed 
in Jane’s Fleet Command ®.  Contextual factors within the scenario, which affect 
decisions, include such things as whether or not troops or aircraft are in the area of the 
target. 
In all, 28 gun problems were presented to participants during the scenario either 
alone or in combination with one another.  For 16 of these gun problems, the correct 
course of action to take is that which is recommended by the NSFSA.  However, for 12 
of these problems, contextual factors within the scenario made selecting the 
recommended solution either wrong or sub-optimal.  This was accomplished by inserting 
10 key events into the scenario, which make system recommendations about whether to 
continue to fire on specific targets, to reallocate targets to another gun mount, to cancel 
targets, or to use different ammunition incorrect.  For example, during the scenario, 
transducer damage occurs to a gun, which degrades its accuracy.  The NSFSA 
recommends reallocating the target to the other gun because the target assigned is 
‘accuracy sensitive’.  However, a ‘Red Cross humanitarian effort’ is also occurring in the 
vicinity of the target at the same time.  Thus, while the recommended course of action by 
the decision support tool is to find a new way to fire on the target, the situational context 
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in the scenario makes the best course of action to cancel the target to minimize the risk of 
firing on humanitarian aid.   
 In some cases, these scenario events do not impact the correctness of the 
recommended course of action.  One involves the appearance of a high-flying aircraft in 
the target area.  During the training phase, participants are instructed that the ceiling for 
projectiles is 18,000 feet.  The high-flying aircraft is actually above this ceiling and 
should not impact the mission.  At this time, the NSFSA has made no recommendations 
to cancel the targets and the correct response to this event should be for the participant to 
report the high flyer to the TAO and accept the recommendation of the NSFSA to 
continue firing on targets. 
 
Fault Management Questionnaire 
 
A 40-item fault management questionnaire was developed (see Appendix D), 
which was administered after participants completed the experimental scenario.  This 
questionnaire was designed to assess participants’ knowledge in four areas: general 







General Domain Knowledge 
 
Ten questions within the questionnaire were designed to assess participant 
knowledge of the Naval Gunfire Support domain.  In general, these questions focused on 
declarative knowledge to which the participants were exposed in early training.  For 
example, this section contains questions about NTDS symbology, ammunition types, 




Ten questions within the Fault Management Questionnaire focused on diagnosis 
of the impact of faults on physical components and entities within the land attack 
mission.  Generally, these questions consisted of vignettes in which a fault is presented 
along with relevant contextual factors of a mission.  Participants were then asked through 
multiple-choice questions to diagnose whether the fault represented a problem that 
needed to be evaluated.  For example, the vignette provided a gun fault that causes 
rounds fired to be less accurate.  The participant had to determine from the information 
presented whether it was particularly necessary to be accurate and whether it was 








Ten questions in the questionnaire were designed to assess the ability of users to 
determine how particular gun problems would impact the mission.  Like the diagnostic 
questions, these prognostic questions were in the form of brief vignettes followed by a 
series of multiple-choice questions.  For example, a particular gun problem may damage 
the gun and make it unavailable to fire on future targets within the mission.  However, it 
may be that the situation is such that damage to the gun is less important than firing on a 
specific target.  The participant had to make a determination, based on the information 
provided as to whether or not taking the recommended course of action will presents a 




Within the Naval Gunfire Support domain, there are often several actions that can 
be taken to achieve the same outcome.  For example, if a gun problem degrades accuracy, 
the problem can be remedied by either reallocating a particular target to another gun 
mount or by using more accurate ammunition.  Ten multiple choice questions within the 
Fault Management Questionnaire were designed to assess the knowledge of users to 
determine which compensatory actions may be appropriate for a given gun problem 





Appendix E contains the pretest all participants took after training was completed.  
The 10-item pretest was developed to insure that the participants understand the 
important aspects of the Naval gunfire support mission.  Specifically, the test addressed 
three areas.  First, the pretest asks questions about each of the 5 potential gun problems 
that could be present during the scenario and what assumptions can be made about them.  
Second, questions address the nature of the ammunition that is available during the 
mission.  The final questions deal with aspects of the mission itself and are designed to 
determine whether participants understood their role in terms of communication with the 
TAO and their responsibilities for firing on targets.  Once the participants completed this 
pretest, the experimenter reviewed it and remediated the participants on any questions 
that they did not answer correctly. 
 
Participant Reaction Questionnaire 
 
The Participant Reaction Questionnaire in Appendix F was designed to be 
administered following performance on the experimental scenario.  The purpose of this 
10-item questionnaire is to obtain participant feedback on aspects of the decision support 
tool, the training, and the scenario.  Further, questions will address how much confidence 
participants had in the recommendations of the NSFSA and how well participants 




 The experiment followed a one-way, between-subjects design.  The between-
subjects factor was the feedback condition consisting of four levels (no feedback, logic 




 The no feedback condition served as a control for this investigation and data were 
collected to determine whether, in fact, providing feedback in addition to recommended 
courses of action significantly improved diagnostic, prognostic, and compensatory 
performance in a fault management task.  In this condition, no feedback in addition to 
recommended courses of action was provided on the Naval Surface Fire Support 
Assistant decision support tool to the operators when gun casualties arise.    
 
Logic Trace Feedback Condition 
 
In the logic trace feedback condition, the same potential courses of action were 
provided to the participants as were provided in the mission impact feedback conditions.  
However, the feedback about each recommended course of action differed in that it was 
in the form of the logic that the NSFSA used to determine the courses of action.  For 
example, a “hydraulic seal hot” in the gun mount might have yielded a recommended 
course of action to reallocate the target to another gun mount.  The feedback for this 
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recommended course of action in this condition took the form: Is there a next pending 
target? Y, Did this mount have problem hydraulic seal leaking? Y, Can problem target be 
reallocated to another gun mount? N, etc. 
 
Mission Impact Feedback Condition 
 
In the mission impact feedback condition, the NSFSA provided feedback about 
the impact of the recommended courses of action on mission schedule so that participants 
could make their decision about which course of action to select.  So, for example, a 
recommendation to fire until gun failure might include feedback that tells the operator 
that selecting this course of action would mean that this gun mount would not be 
available to service a future target in the scenario.  
 
Combined Feedback Condition 
 
Participants in the combined feedback condition receive the same recommended 
courses of action for each gun casualty but the NSFSA displays both the mission impact 









Figure 4 depicts the experimental procedure for this investigation.  Initially, 
experimental runs consisted of administration of informed consent, a privacy act 
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Following random assignment to groups, all participants received the same 
training procedure with one exception.  Displays of the NSFSA testbed software during 
the training presentations and practice scenarios were consistent with the feedback 
condition to which the participant has been assigned.  In other words, Logic Trace 
participants were shown slides of the software with logic trace feedback shown, Mission 
Impact participants saw mission impact feedback, and participants assigned to the group 
receiving both feedback forms saw both in the training.   
The training consisted of an initial familiarization with the NSFS domain and a 
familiarization with the software to be used.  Next, participants had the opportunity to 
practice the task.  Initially the experimenter facilitated this practice and then participants 
had the opportunity to perform tasks on a scenario without assistance.  Participants then 
performed an experimental run followed by a knowledge test, and the administration of a 
trainee reaction questionnaire.  Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 







Upon completion of informed consent and demographics forms, all participants 
began initial training on the Naval Gunfire Support domain utilized for the experiment.  
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This initial training consisted of two videotaped training modules and ‘hands on’ 
instruction with the JFC domain software.  The first videotaped module consisted of 
approximately 10 minutes of instruction on the tasks of the Naval Gun Commander and 
the components of Naval Gunfire Support mission.  During this training module, 
participants became familiar with the overall objectives of the mission, which included 
firing on tactical surface targets and reporting on contacts within the battle area.  The 
primary responsibilities of the gun commander were to report gun problems to the 
Tactical Action Officer (TAO) and to recommend and execute courses of action based on 
the attributes of the mission such as the target schedule, and placement of friendly and 
hostile forces in the vicinity of targets.  Following the initial training on the duties and 
responsibilities of gun commander, participants were trained via videotape to use the JFC 
software for the reference mission.  This training included detailed descriptions of the 
display elements and the ‘button logy’ of the reference mission software.  During this 
segment of training, participants became familiar with Naval Tactical Data Symbology 
(NTDS) and learned how to report attributes (e.g., altitude, bearing, and target type) of 
aircraft and surface ships displayed on Jane’s Fleet command with the aid of a template 
to the TAO.  Further, participants were instructed on how to make recommendations (see 
Appendix D), to the TAO.  During this phase of training, participants performed all of the 







During the NSFSA phase of the training, participant were presented with a 
videotaped description of all of the elements of the tool.  Participants were encouraged 
during this videotape session to ask questions of the experimenter.  The videotape 
described the purpose of the tool and how to use it.  Each screen element and actions for 
use at the mouse-click level were described in detail.  During this tape, participants were 
instructed on each class of gun problem, target attributes and types of ammunition used in 
the scenario.  During this time, participants were also provided with templates (see 
Appendix I) for the gun problem reports that they would make and given instruction on 
how and when to make these reports.  All button actions that were required during 
performance on the scenarios were described.   As mentioned previously, on slides that 
depict the NSFSA, the feedback that was shown was consistent with the condition to 




After training on the domain and the software needed to perform the experimental 
task, participants were given the opportunity to perform a practice scenario with the aid 
of the experimenter.  During this 15-minute scenario, participants used templates to make 
reports on events occurring on the JFC display and gun problems displayed on the 
NSFSA.  The experimenter pointed out relevant aspects of the scenario when appropriate 





Following the facilitated practice, the participant performed the practice scenario 
solo.  Again, the feedback provided by the NSFSA was consistent with the condition to 
which the participant was assigned.  During this phase of the training, the participants 
were still encouraged to ask questions of the experimenter, but the experimenter did not 
actively point out relevant aspects of the mission or guide the process.  The experimenter 
did, however, provide feedback to the participant following performance on the 
individual practice scenario.  As a final performance check, the participant was asked to 
complete the Pre-performance Questionnaire at the end of this phase of training.  The 
experimenter checked this 10-item questionnaire and provided any remedial information 




After participants completed the training, they performed the experimental 
scenario described above.  During this phase of the experiment, participants used both 
software tools and made tactical reports and gun casualty reports to the experimenter, 
who acted as the Tactical Action Officer (TAO).  The experimenter provided no 
information to the participant during the experiment except to acknowledge receipt of the 
report by responding, “TAO, Aye.”  As the participant was performing the scenario, the 
experimenter was collecting dependent measures on a coding sheet, shown in Appendix 
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J.  This coding sheet listed each of the thirty gun casualties that occurred during the 
scenario, the correct response, and the correct rationale for the response as determined by 
the subject matter expert designers.  The experimenter coded whether or not the correct 
action was taken, and whether the rationale for the action was consistent with the 
rationale provided. 
 After performance on the scenario, participants were asked to complete the Fault 
Management Questionnaire (Appendix D) and the Trainee Reaction Questionnaire 
(Appendix F).  Upon completion of both questionnaires, participants were debriefed, 






Two main dependent measures were used to test the hypothesis that participants 
receiving logic trace only feedback would provide better diagnoses than participants 
receiving mission impact feedback.  First, diagnoses obtained from gun casualty reports 
were assessed against an expert solution of the mission provided by the subject matter 
experts who designed the scenario.  Part of the gun casualty report that users made was to 
describe why performing particular courses of action represented problems in terms of 
other components of the mission.  For example, for a report of transducer damage to a 
mount, the report template required that the user report.  “TAO, GUNS, I have 
TRANSDUCER DAMAGE to MT51.  This (IS)/IS NOT a problem for us now because 
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IT DEGRADES THE ACCURACY OF PROJECTILES.   I recommend 
REALLOCATING TARGET 7 to MT52 because TARGET 7 is ACCURACY 
SENSITIVE”.  The diagnosis that the “transducer damage degrades the accuracy of the 
mount” would be considered a correct diagnosis of the problem and counted as such.  
Thus, responses on the portion of the gun casualty report template that corresponds to the 
information in the logic trace feedback was evaluated against the expert solution.  As 
such, the first dependent measure for diagnosis was the number of correct/incorrect 
diagnoses made over the course of the mission. 
The second dependent measure to test the diagnosis hypotheses was the number 




The second hypothesis for this investigation was that users receiving mission 
impact feedback would make better prognoses of the impact of the performing specific 
courses of action on the maintaining the mission plan.  The dependent measures for 
prognoses were collected online via the gun casualty reports. The portion of the report 
that corresponds to mission impact, that a particular target was accuracy sensitive and 
therefore cannot be fired upon from that mount was evaluated against the expert solution 
for correctness and the frequency of correct/incorrect actions was used as a dependent 
measure.  Second, scores on the prognosis questions of the Fault Management 





 The third hypothesis tested addressed whether users receiving both logic trace and 
mission impact feedback performed better compensatory actions than users who received 
one form of feedback alone.  This hypothesis was primarily evaluated by the number of 
courses of action taken correctly/incorrectly and scores on the compensation section of 
the Fault Management Questionnaire.   Further, the latency of performing correct actions 
was collected from the output files of the NSFSA to determine whether receiving both 
forms of feedback results in the ability to take the appropriate action more quickly.  
While participants will be required to ready roughly twice as much feedback in the ‘both’ 
condition, the statements are relatively short.  The time to read the additional feedback 
should be negligible and the advantages of having both forms of feedback readily 




The analyses of each of these measures were accomplished by performing one-
way between-subjects a priori analyses of variance across the three conditions (logic 
trace, mission impact, both).  These tests determined whether any observed differences 
between groups represented statistically significant main effects vice random differences 
that may be attributed to chance. 
The major hypotheses stated that logic trace feedback would support better 
diagnostic decision making, mission impact feedback would support better prognoses, 
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and providing both would result in better compensation for gun problems.   It was further 
predicted that providing some form of feedback would result in better performance than 
providing no feedback in addition to recommended courses of action.  One way analyses 
of variance across the dependent measures described in the preceding sections will 
statistically determine whether these directional hypotheses are supported.  
In addition to the analyses described above, analyses of variance were performed 
on the demographic data to determine whether randomly assigned groups were equivalent 
on variables such as age and computer experience.  Similarly, responses to trainee 
reactions was analyzed using statistical tests appropriate to the data for investigation of 





Random Assignment  
 
 An analysis of the demographic data collected from questionnaires demonstrated 
no significant differences between the experimental conditions in gender, age, class 
standing, computer experience, or videogame experience.   Table 1 provides detail of the 
participant demographics for median age, gender ratio, computer experience, and 
videogame experience.   
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(years) 21.5 20 22.0 21 > .05 
Gender 
(M/F) 10/5 5/10 8/7 7/8 >.05 
Computer 
Experience* 3.86 3.80 3.80 3.87 >.05 
Videogame 
Experience** 2.79 3.20 2.60 2.67 >.05 
 
*1 to 4 scale.  1=What’s a computer, 5=frequently use computers 
**1 to 5 scale: 1=Never play videogames, play frequently. 
 
  
Analysis of the class standing data also revealed no signification differences between the 
groups in the education levels of the participants.  The majority of participants were 
junior level or above in class standing with 11 participants at the graduate level.  
  
Hypothesis I Results  
 
 It was expected that operators receiving either logic trace feedback, mission 
impact, or both types of feedback would perform better at fault management tasks than 
operators receiving only recommended courses of action.  However, the results of a priori 
one-way analysis of variance did not support this hypothesis.  This the accuracy data 
yielded no significant differences between the participants who did not receive additional 
feedback over and above a recommended course of action and those who did in the 
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average number of correct rationales for selecting a course of action.  Table 3 shows the 
mean number of correct responses to gun problems for each of the conditions.  While 
there were no statistically significant differences between groups in the mean numbers of 
correct actions, participants with no feedback were correct less of the time in the 
diagnostic reasoning that they provided for why they had chosen a particular course of 
action to take.  Across the scenario, participants receiving some form of feedback 
provided, on average, 14.13 correct diagnostic rationales.  This was compared  to 
participants receiving no feedback, who, on average, provided 11.9 correct rationales 
across the scenario t(27)=1.82, p<.05.   This effect did not hold true for prognostic 
reasoning as there were no significant differences between feedback conditions in the 
frequency of correct reasons given on the impact of the gun casualty and the selected 
course of action on the mission.  
 
Table 2.  
Frequency of Correct Responses to Gun Casualties by Condition 
 Mean Number Correct Std. Dev 
Combined Feedback 19.1 3.84 
Mission Impact 20.0 3.25 
Logic Trace 20.2 2.37 






Hypothesis II Results 
 
 It was expected that operators receiving logic trace feedback would be better at 
fault diagnosis than operators receiving mission impact feedback only.  For the purposes 
of this investigation, it was predicted that individuals in the logic trace feedback only 
condition would make a significantly greater number of correct diagnoses in gun casualty 
reports during performance on a Naval Surface Fire Support Mission than individuals 
receiving mission impact feedback only.  This was assessed by the number of correct 
rationales given across the scenario for the selection of courses of action in reports to the 
role-player supervisor in the investigation.   A between groups t-test of the number of 
correct rationales provided by the logic trace group and the mission impact group did not 
yield support for this hypothesis.  While the mean number of correct rationales given was 
greater for the logic trace condition (mean=14.1, std. dev.=5.07) than the mean number 
for the mission impact group (mean = 13.6, std. dev. 6.81), this difference was not 
statistically significant.  Further, it was expected that the participants in the logic trace 
only condition would have significantly more correct answers on the diagnostic portion 
of a post-scenario questionnaire.   
 Of the ten diagnosis questions on the post-scenario fault management 
questionnaire, participants in the logic trace condition scored a mean of 9.8 questions 
correct (std. dev=1.15), while those in the mission impact group responded to a mean of 
9.47 items correctly (std. dev. = 0.99).  The high correct response rates to these questions, 
for these two groups as well as the other groups indicates that participants were highly 
aware of the correct reasoning for the selection of a particular course of action.  
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Hypothesis III Results 
 
 It was expected that operators receiving mission impact feedback would provide 
better prognoses of the faults on the mission than operators receiving only logic trace 
feedback.  Operationally this meant that participants in this group would make a 
significantly higher number of correct reports on the impact of a gun casualty on the 
completion of a pre-planned Naval Surface Fire Support mission scenario than 
individuals receiving logic trace feedback only.  However, the data did not support this 
hypothesis.  While the a priori one-way analysis of variance did not show the two groups 
to have significantly different frequencies of correct report, mission impact participants 
on average were slightly less correct in their reports than logic trace participants, with 
means of 15.2 and 15.8 correct reports, respectively.   The same analysis was performed 
on the number of correct answers to the 10 mission impact items on the post-scenario 
fault management questionnaire.  Mission impact participants, on average, scored 5.87 
correct on the mission impact questions, while logic trace participants scored 6.4 correct.  
However, these results were not statistically significant. 
 
Hypothesis IV Results 
 
The final hypothesis in this investigation was that operators receiving both the 
logic trace feedback and the mission impact feedback would be able to better compensate 
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for system faults than operators receiving either mission impact feedback alone or logic 
trace feedback alone.  In the context of the current investigation, it was predicted that 
participants receiving both forms of feedback will make significantly more correct 
responses to gun casualties in the Naval Surface Fire Support scenario in significantly 
less time than participant receiving only one form of feedback.  In fact, on average, these 
participants made slightly fewer correct compensatory actions (19.07 correct) than 
participants in the mission impact (20 correct), logic trace (20.2 correct), or no feedback 
conditions (20.5 correct), although this difference was not statistically significant.  
Further, there were no significant differences in the amount of time that it took for 
participants receiving combined feedback (115 seconds, std. dev.=55) to respond to a gun 
casualty than it did for participants receiving one form of feedback (118 seconds, std. 
dev. =28.7).   
During observations of the data collection the researcher noted that, on several of 
the gun casualties related to transducer damage, which reduces the accuracy of the gun 
that participants were reallocating the target to the other gun and then switching 
ammunition to ERGM.  Switching to ERGM was an unnecessary extra step, which was 
advised against in the training since it was an additional expense with no benefit to the 
accuracy in these cases.  Consequently, analyses were performed to determine whether 
one or several groups performed this error of commission more often than any other 
group.  Interestingly, participants receiving both forms of feedback (logic trace and 
mission impact) made significantly fewer of these errors of commission than the other 
groups t(27)=1.963, p=.05.  
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Finally, it was predicted that the participant receiving both forms of feedback 
would score higher on the compensation section of a post-scenario questionnaire.  This 
hypothesis was not supported by a priori one-way analysis of variance conducted on the 
questionnaire data.  There were no significant differences between the groups in the 
number of correct responses to the compensation questions on the fault management 
questionnaire. 
 
Trainee Reaction Questionnaire 
 
 Table 3 provides the means to the overall participant reactions to the task and the 
training provided during the experiment.  The actual questionnaire that was used to assess 
these reactions is provided in Appendix F.  The ratings were anchored with 1 being ‘not 
at all’ and 7 being either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ (satisfied, well, etc.) in response to the 
questions.  Results of the analyses of these data indicate that overall participants appeared 
to have no strong reactions to the dimensions above, neither feeling that they performed 
particularly well or poorly, that the training was particularly satisfying, or that the 
decision support tool helped in performing the task.  Further analysis of these data by 
condition revealed no significant differences between the groups in response to any of the 
individual questions.  Thus, only the mean ratings of these questions are offered to 
demonstrate that no strong feelings were evoked of the participants by the training, the 

















This could be interpreted to mean that participants did not particularly feel negative about 
the experiment and were not particularly overworked or overstressed by the tasks that 
they performed. 
 








Performance 4.00 3.80 4.07 3.87 3.93 
Satisfaction with 
Training 4.60 5.13 5.07 5.00 4.95 
Understood Task 4.20 4.60 4.73 4.60 4.53 
NSFSA Helpfulness 4.80 5.73 5.60 4.73 5.22 
Confidence in NSFSA 4.80 5.00 5.07 4.73 4.90 
Decision support by 
NSFSA 5.53 5.53 5.60 5.07 5.43 
Feedback supporting 
performance 5.20 5.47 5.53 5.00 5.30 
Feedback supporting 
diagnosis 4.87 5.07 5.07 4.67 4.92 
Feedback supporting 
mission impact 
understanding? 4.60 5.13 4.60 4.87 4.80 
Feedback supporting 
COA 4.40 5.47 4.67 4.67 4.80 
Feedback supporting 






Several interpretations of the results of this investigation can be drawn from the 
lack of significant support for the hypotheses.  First, it could be argued that the predictive 
capabilities of Rasmussen’s (1986) fault management model do not generalize beyond 
the domains of process control into military fault management decision-making.   An 
alternative interpretation is that the investigation was, in some manner, invalid and did 
not adequately test the hypotheses.  The following sections will investigate these two 
possibilities to critically examine whether either possibility represents a plausible 
explanation of the results.  
 
Process Control and Military Decision Making Differences.  
 
 This investigation represents a first step toward the application of Rasmussen’s 
(1986) fault management decision ladder to fault management in a complex military 
domain.   While the origins of the model were heavily rooted in process control domains 
like the nuclear power and chemical process control plant operations, the validity of the 
model rests in its ability to predict fault management decision making across a range of 
domains.  At first glance, the results of the current investigation could be interpreted as 
an indication that the Rasmussen (1986) fault management decision making model 
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focuses on traditional process control tasks and does not have application in complex 
military decision making tasks.  In other words, the two domains are sufficiently different 
that the model does not apply.  However, this view would be a very narrow interpretation 
of the capability of the model to predict fault management decision-making.   
  Fault management decision making within traditional process control domains are 
likely to share the same major decision making processes as those in complex military 
fault management decision making.   Specifically, both domains share the processes of 
detection, diagnosis, prognosis, and compensation posited by Rogers et al. (1986).  
However, where the two domains differ most notably is in two of the factors, which 
influence how individuals evaluate and interpret faults during diagnosis and prognosis.   
These are the level of ambiguity in the data and the ultimate goal or target state.   In 
general, well-defined and highly predictable physical processes govern process control 
tasks.  The number and complexity of these predictable variables and the interaction 
between them drive ambiguity in process control (Moray, 1997; Woods and Hanes, 
1986).  The target state for this domain is often to reach some level of stability in often 
slow (long lag time) processes.  Conversely, within military fault management decision-
making, ambiguity is driven primarily by human behavior, of enemy, neutral, and 
friendly forces at a much faster pace.  While the behavioral sciences continue to improve 
our capability to predict human performance and decision-making, the fact remains that 
our ability to make these predictions is not equivalent to predicting performance of 
physical processes.   
The goal or target state is also less well defined in military fault management 
decision-making.    A stable steady state is often neither possible nor desired.  For 
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example, in several of the gun casualties in this investigation, the operator was given a 
choice between reallocating firing to another gun mount or firing until gun failure.  
Depending on the criticality of the target and the ultimate goals of the mission, firing 
until gun failure was the only reasonable option that could be taken.    Thus, there are 
circumstances in military combat where it is reasonable and, in fact sometimes laudable, 
to allow a weapons system to be destroyed to meet the objectives of the mission or to 
save the lives of friendly combatants.  
These two differences between process control and military fault management 
decision-making, differing degrees of ambiguity in the tasks and differing target or goal 
states, may explain the lack of support that the current investigation showed for the 
application of this model to the domain.  Future investigations should focus on increasing 
the predictive validity of the model by refining the fault management model to account 




A major goal of this investigation was to address the need for decision support 
tools to provide assistance to Navy warfighters in an increasing complex and uncertain 
domain perform their jobs effectively with fewer people.  This real world problem 
required a premium to be placed on the external validity of this applied investigation.  
However, with this emphasis, come potential threats to other areas of experimental 
validity, which must be considered when undertaking an investigation of this type.  
Perhaps the most comprehensive review of these threats to validity, countermeasures 
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against them and the interactions between types of validity can be found in Cook and 
Campbell (1986).  As these authors point out, applied research often has a different set of 
priorities than highly controlled laboratory research.  As a result, tradeoffs often must be 
made to support generalization to a specific targeted setting or a particular group of 
interest.  One could interpret the lack of statistical support for the hypotheses in this 
investigation to be the result of trading off or not considering some aspect of 
experimental validity to meet the objectives of high external validity.   Given the lack of 
statistical support for the hypotheses in the current investigation, it was necessary to 
examine these validity issues to insure that they were not a factor in the results.    
One possible threat to validity was considered to be “statistical conclusion 
validity,” which is concerned with the degree to which the investigation is sensitive 
enough to permit reasonable statements about covariation, cause and effect, and the 
strength of covariation.  The authors cite several major threats to statistical conclusion 
validity that must be considered.   Arguably the most common experimental errors made 
with respect to these threats are having low statistical power, violating the assumptions of 
the statistical tests, and error rate problems.  However, a power analysis was conducted 
prior to this investigation indicating an 83% chance of detecting a medium effect size 
(0.65) given the levels of variability demonstrated in similar studies and a with a planned 
sample size of 60 participants.  The largest effect size demonstrated in the current 
investigation (0.36) indicated slightly fewer correct responses (0.36) in the ‘combined 
feedback” conditions than in the no feedback condition (19.1 versus 20.5).  The result of 
a post-hoc power analysis of these data indicates that running approximately 3 times as 
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many participants would not significantly support the hypothesis that participants 
receiving combined feedback would provide more correct responses.    
A second potential threat to statistical conclusion validity cited by Cook et al. 
(1986) relates to violation of the assumptions to statistical tests.  The current investigation 
relied on analyses of variance using mean scores.   Tests for normality and homogeneity 
of variance conducted in the data analysis revealed no violations to these assumptions.  
Moreover, the experimental design was such that observations were independent of one 
another.   These factors lend confidence that the investigation was valid with respect to its 
statistical conclusions.  Further, analysis of variance is a rather robust statistical test and 
would very likely have been able to account for any minor variations.  Finally, careful 
attention was paid to insuring that there were no differences between participants on 
relevant demographics and, other than the experimental manipulations, in the way that 
each participant was run during data collection. 
Construct validity is concerned with confounding variables and that variables 
have the potential to be construed in terms of more than one construct.  Given the 
complexity of the task and constructs there was some danger that threats to construct 
validity may have manifest themselves in this investigation.  However, Cook et al. (1986) 
recommend several countermeasures against threats to validity, which include thinking 
through the definitions of the constructs, differentiating between constructs, deciding 
which measures can be used to index these constructs, and developing multiple measures 
of the constructs, where possible.  Much of the initial focus of the current investigation 
was on operationally defining the constructs of detection, diagnosis, prognosis, and 
compensation, determining their boundaries, and developing measures to index each of 
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these constructs.  However, while there was careful planning, like most constructs in the 
behavioral sciences, there was still some room for subjective interpretation on the part of 
the investigator.  Whether this interpretation was accurate, the boundaries were well 
defined, and the measures were adequate indices of the constructs always has some room 
for debate.  Future research should focus on further refining the definitions,. constructs, 
and measures involved in military fault management tasks. 
The final area of potential threat to the validity of the investigation was internal 
validity, which is concerned with whether or not two or more variables are causally 
related.  There are a number of threats, which fall under this category, many of which can 
be minimized through randomization and control procedures to insure that there are no 
systematic differences between participants and conditions across the investigation.  It is 
unlikely that the current investigation fell prey to major threats to internal validity for 
several reasons.  First, randomization was utilized and no major difference between 
relevant participant attributes was identified.  Second, the investigation took place over a 
short period of time and within a laboratory setting, which did not change over the course 
of the data collection.  Third, much of the training consisted of ‘canned’ presentations 
and the interaction between the participants and investigators was carefully scripted 
during the data collection.  Further, even the format of participant responses was 
formatted according to report templates.  These control mechanisms left little room for 
participants to have systematically different experiences across groups.  
 Clearly, no study exists without potential threats to validity.   The current study is 
no exception.   However, the preceding examination of these potential threats yielded no 
major areas of concern.  Multiple steps were taken to insure that, while there was an 
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emphasis on the external validity of the study, statistical conclusion, construct, and 
internal validity were all considered to be critical factors as well.   This lends credence to 
the interpretation that the lack of statistical support for the hypotheses in this 
investigation was not due to issues of experimental validity.  Rather, the more likely 
culprit lies in the differences between process control and military fault management 
decision-making tasks in terms of ambiguity and target goal states.  Future investigations 
should focus on refining of the Rasmussen (1986) model within the domain of military 
fault management decision support, as well as other domains,  through a better 
understanding of how these two factors, ambiguity and goal states, may impact the 
predictions of the models.   
 The following section will describe several interesting findings from the current 
investigation that may be utilized as ‘lessons learned’ for future research in this area. 
 
Future Research Considerations 
 
 As discussed in the previous sections, none of the major hypotheses of this 
investigation were directly supported by statistical analysis of the dependent measures 
determined a priori. However, while not specifically hypothesized, two interesting results 
did  arise iin the data analyses.  First, participants receiving any feedback at all were able 
to provide significantly more correct rationales for why a particular gun fault represented 
a problem to the successful to the gun mount.  This result may suggest that additional 
information provided over and above an identification of the problem may assist 
operators in at the least understanding whether that problem is in reality a problem or 
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whether it is just noise.  Further research in this area  should consider focusing on the 
cues that operators use to develop a correct diagnostic rationale and how those can be 
instantiated in feedback from a decision support tool.   
 A second interesting finding from this study was that operators who received both 
logic trace and mission impact feedback made fewer errors of commission than those 
receiving only logic trace, only mission impact, or no feedback at all.  It is likely that 
both forms of feedback taken together provided the participants with a better 
understanding of the specific type of task that the transducer damage problem 
represented.  Of all of the gun casualties in this investigation, transducer damage was 
perhaps the most complex to resolve because there were multiple options the operators 
could take.  Further, failure to respond correctly had very clear consequences.  Operators 
could continue firing with decreased accuracy only at the peril of troops or friendly forces 
in the area.   Finally, this particular gun casualty had very clear consequences in terms of 
cost.  In the training, it was stressed that ERGM was an expensive solution to decreased 
accuracy and should only be used as a last resort.  Since many of the errors of 
commission directly related to this particular gun casualty, future study should be 
directed toward gaining a better understanding how the variables of task complexity, 
perceived complexity, and decision support feedback may interact to produce errors of 
commission.  
 In addition to the factors examined in the previous section, several other factors 
may have contributed to the lack of statistical support for the four primary hypotheses 
offered in this investigation.  First, while much effort was devoted to developing a rich 
scenario for hypothesis testing, the tasks of the participants themselves were not as robust 
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as might be imagined from the complexity of the scenario described previously.  For 
most gun casualties, there were only a limited number of actions that were appropriate for 
the operator to take.  The training that was provided to the participants covered each of 
the types of gun casualties, their causes, potential impacts on the mission, and the correct 
responses in great detail.  Consequently, by the time participants were seated before the 
final scenario, they were very well trained in all aspects of the experimental task, where 
to obtain information, and how to report it.  The relatively high scores across groups may 
be more testimony to the training the participants received and perhaps less related to the 
feedback that the Naval Surface Fire Support Assistant provided.   
 Second, as is the case in most investigations that seek to simulate some form of 
complex military decision-making task, there were a number of motivational factors that 
were missing from this investigation.  In the Naval gunfire support domain, there are very 
real consequences to making mistakes.  Actual gun casualties have consequences that 
cannot be adequately simulated in a laboratory environment.  These include not just the 
potential loss of life but damage to ones career and reputation as well.  Consequently, the 
participants in this investigation were highly likely to have had much less concern over 
the consequences of an erroneous action than would be seen in the actual domain.  This 
interpretation is partially supported by the trainee reaction questionnaire, which showed 
few strong feelings about the elements of the investigation.  If participants had felt high 
workload, uncertainty, or confusion, it would be expected that they would have provided 
data on the trainee reaction questionnaire to support their feelings.  While this fact does 
not completely explain the lack of support for the hypotheses, it is one factor that 
probably contributed to participant performance.  If possible, future studies of this type 
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should recruit from actual gun commanders in the fleet, who would have a better idea of 
the risks and would have more extensive training in the subtleties and complexities of the 
task as well.  This would also allow for the development of a more realistic and robust 






This study was performed to investigate the potential of tailoring decision support 
feedback to support the diagnostic, prognostic, and compensatory stages of fault 
management.  While the strategies for feedback chosen appeared to have little effect on 
the prescribed outcome variables in this investigation, it is possible that Rasmussen’s 
(1986) model, which was based in process control research may be in need of refinement 
to be of utility in a military fault management domain, in which variables and target 
outcomes are often more ambiguous.  In addition, the results of this investigation suggest 
that several other factors may have been likely to account for some of the impact of 
decision support feedback in fault management.  The results of this investigation do 
provide some clues to which of those factors may relate to the effectiveness of decision 
support feedback.  Task complexity, motivational factors, consequences of failure, 
training, and the format of feedback clearly have some impact on decision-making and 
error in these situations.  All of these factors have been cited as potential causal factors in 
poor performance on real-world fault management situations.  The current study 
represents an initial investigation into using a fault management decision-making model 
to guide the development of decision support feedback in this domain.  Future studies 
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INFORMED VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 
1.  I am being asked to voluntarily participate in a 
research study titled, AN INVESTIGATION INTO PROVIDING 
FEEDBACK TO USERS OF DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR FAULT 
MANAGEMENT.   I will be asked to perform training on the 
use of the Naval Surface Fire Support Assistant, a 
computerized decision support tool for Naval Gun 
Commanders.  This training will consist of watching several 
videotapes and slide shows as well as performing several 
practice scenarios with experimenter assistance on standard 
computers. Upon the completion of this training, I will be 
asked to perform a war game scenario in which I will make 
decisions about the mission with the aid of this tool.  My 
duties during this scenario will be to solve gun problems 
and report events to an experimenter.   
 
2.   I understand that the investigators believe that the 
risks or discomforts to me are as follows:  
 
There are no foreseeable risks to participating in this 
study over those that might be expected in the training of 
any computer software and playing a typical computer game.   
  
3.   The benefits that I may expect from my participation 
in this study are minimal. I understand that I will receive 
monetary compensation and/or course extra credit for my 
participation as well as the knowledge that participation 
in this study will aid efforts to improve the performance, 
safety, and/or the effectiveness of US Navy.  I may have a 
copy of any publications resulting from the current study 
if I so desire.  
 
4.  My confidentiality during the study will be ensured by 
assigning me a coded identification number. My name will 
not be directly associated with any data. The 
confidentiality of the information related to my 
participation in this research will be ensured by 
maintaining records only coded by identification numbers. 
Video and photographic images of me will not be published 
or displayed without my specific written permission. 
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5. If I have questions about this study I should contact 
the following individuals: 
 
James Pharmer, (Principle Investigator)  
Code 4961  
Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division (NAWCTSD)   
12350 Research Parkway,  




Trish Hamburger, (Project Manager) 
Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division 
17320 Dahlgren Road 




Dr. Jerry Laabs(Acting Chair, Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects) 
Code 4.9T 
Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division (NAWCTSD)   
12350 Research Parkway,  




6.  My participation in this study is completely voluntary.  
 
7.  My participation in this study may be stopped by the 
investigator at any time without my consent if it is 
believed the decision is in my best interest. There will be 
no penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise 
entitled at the time my participation is stopped. 
 
8.  No out of pocket costs to me may result from my 
voluntary participation in this study. 
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9.  If I decide to withdraw from further participation in 
this study, there will be no penalties. To ensure my safe 
and orderly withdrawal from the study, I will inform the 
Principal Investigator, James A. Pharmer.  
 
10.  Official government agencies may have a need to 
inspect the research records from this study, including 
mine, in order to fulfill their responsibilities. 
 
11.  I have received a statement informing me about the 
provisions of the Privacy Act (attached). 
 
12.  I have been informed that the CPHS Coordinator is 
responsible for storage of research records related to my 
participation in this study.  My consent form will be 
stored under lock and key in compliance with NAWCTSD 
Policies and Procedures for the Protection of Human 
Subjects. 
 
13.  I have been given an opportunity to ask questions 
about this study and its related procedures and risks, as 
well as any of the other information contained in this 
consent form. All my questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I understand what has been explained in this 
consent form about my participation in this study. I do not 
need any further information to make a decision whether or 
not to volunteer as a participant in this study. By my 
signature below, I give my voluntary informed consent to 
participate in the research as it has been explained to me, 
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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT 
 
1. Authority. 5 U.S.C. 301 
 
2. Purpose. Performance speed and accuracy information will 
be collected in an experimental research project titled, 
“AN INVESTIGATION INTO PROVIDING FEEDBACK TO USERS OF 
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR FAULT MANAGEMENT” to 
investigate the effectiveness of different feedback 
training techniques on performance. 
 
3. Routine Uses. The data collected will be used for 
analyses and reports by the Departments of the Navy and 
Defense, other U.S. Government agencies, and authorized 
government contractors. Additional use of the information 
may be granted to non-Government agencies or individuals 
by the Navy Surgeon General following the provisions of 
the Freedom of Information Act or contracts and 
agreements. I voluntarily agree to its disclosure to the 
agencies or individuals identified above, and I have been 
informed that failure to agree to this disclosure may 
make the research less useful.  
 
4. Voluntary Disclosure. Provision of information is 
voluntary. Failure to provide the requested information 
may result in failure to be accepted as a research 
volunteer in an experiment, or removal from the program. 
 
Attached: Informed Voluntary Consent To Participate for 
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Targets and Attributes in Performance Scenario 
 
Time sent Target# Target Type Sensitivity Round 
Type 
#  of Rounds Priority 
10 1 COMMAND_POST #ROUNDS HE 5 6
10 2 ARMOR START TIME HE 15 8
10 3 BRIDGE AMMO TYPE ERGM 5 9
25 4 AIRFIELD START TIME HE 5 9
25 5 GUNS START TIME HE 5 9
25 6 TROOPS AMMO TYPE HE 5 9
40 7 ARMOR AMMO TYPE HE 5 1
530 8 COMMAND_POST START TIME HE 10 9
530 9 COMMAND_POST #ROUNDS HE 5 9
530 10 GUNS ACCURACY HE 5 9
530 11 AIRFIELD ACCURACY HE 5 9
530 12 TROOPS START TIME HE 10 9
530 13 GUNS START TIME HE 5 9
1250 14 AIRFIELD START TIME HE 5 9
1250 15 COMMAND_POST END TIME HE 5 9
1500 16 TROOPS ACCURACY HE 5 9
1500 17 AIRFIELD ACCURACY HE 5 9
1900 18 GUNS ACCURACY HE 5 9
1900 19 TROOPS ACCURACY HE 10 9
2100 20 COMMAND_POST #ROUNDS HE 10 6
2100 21 BRIDGE START TIME HE 5 8
2350 22 ARMOR START TIME HE 5 9
2350 23 TROOPS START TIME HE 10 2
2550 24 GUNS ACCURACY HE 10 9
2550 25 AIRFIELD #ROUNDS HE 5 9
2850 26 GUNS START TIME HE 10 9
2850 27 AIRFIELD START TIME HE 5 9
3050 28 COMMAND_POST ACCURACY HE 10 9
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1. What is the gun commander’s mission? 
 
A. To support an air assault by destroying or neutralizing 
enemy defenses  
B. To support an amphibious assault by destroying or 
neutralizing enemy defenses 
C. To provide appropriate guidance and feedback to Naval 
officers 
D. To report friendly submarine contacts to Marine 
Amphibious Units. 
E. None of the above 
 
 
2. What is the Combat Information Center (CIC)? 
 
A. A land-based information center that provides assistance 
to the gun commander 
B. A satellite network system that the gun commander is able 
to access when emergency information is required 
C. A space where the ships weapons and sensors are employed 
D. A Naval communications center, located in Norfork, VA 
E. None of the above 
 
 
3. Who will you (the gun commander) make reports to? 
 
A. The Tactical Action Officer (TAO) 
B. The Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) 
C. The Combat Information Center (CIC) 
D. The Air Spotter (AS) 
E. None of the above 
 
 
4. T   or    F Target scheduling occurs in the Combat 
Information Center (CIC)? 
 
 





D. Grid Coordinates 
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E. None of the Above 
 
 
6. Who assigns responsibilities and schedules the amphibious 
assault? 
 
A. The Tactical Action Officer (TAO) 
B. The Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) 
C. The Commanding Naval Officer (CNO) 
D. The Air Spotter (AS) 
E. None of the above 
 
 
7. Which of the following does not describe a spotter? 
 
A. Gives CIC corrections to the aim point 
B. Provides feedback as to mission success 
C. Is able to see the target 
D. May provide information on movement of enemy forces 
E. None of the above 
 
 
8. The battle space should be thought of as a 3-dimensional 
box with a ceiling of 
 
A. 24,000 feet 
B. 5,000 feet 
C. 16,000 feet 
D. 18,000 feet 
E. None of the above 
 
 




B. Very low priority 
C. Very high priority 
D. Accuracy sensitive 
E. None of the above 
 
 
10. On Jane’s Fleet Command, hostile contacts are 







E. None of the above 
 
 




12. A “speedleader” gives what? 
 
A. A quick indication of the course only of each contact 
B. A quick indication of the speed only of each contact 
C. A quick indication of the course and speed of each 
contact 
D. An elaborate explanation of the course only of each 
contact 
E. None of the above 
 
13. In Jane’s Fleet Command, targets are identified with 
the symbol 
 
A.  T 
B. X 
C.   o 
D. F 
E. None of the above 
 
14. For the NSFSA and for Jane’s Fleet Command, prehook 
information can be obtained by 
 
A. Right clicking on the contact 
B. Pressing the F4 key 
C. Pressing the Enter key 
D. Placing the mouse over the contact 
E. None of the above 
 
 
15. The gun commander is able to see text for messages 
received by 
 
A. Right clicking on the contact 
B. Pressing the F4 key 
C. Pressing the Enter key 
D. Placing the mouse over the contact 




16. T   or    F The NSFSA is able to incorporate 
information gained through Jane’s Fleet 
Command when making recommendations 
about courses of action. 
 
17. In NSFSA, a target that is displayed as partially red 
and partially green  
 
A. Has not yet been fired on 
B. Is in progress 
C. Is very high priority 
D. Has already been fired on 
E. None of the above 
 
 
A target with a priority of 1  
 
A. Is very low priority 
B. Is neither high nor low priority 
C. Is very high priority 
D. Has already been fired on 
E. None of the above 
 
 
When firing, the gun commander should use ______ rounds 
only when there is no alternative. 
 
A. High Explosive (HE) 
B. Smoke 
C. Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM) 
D. Illumination 
E. None of the above 
 
 
T    or     F Transducers are sensors in the gun mount 




In which order are courses of action (COAs) presented? 
 
A. Alphabetical order 
B. Least appropriate first 
C. Most appropriate first 
D. Chronological order 




What does a green check mark next to a COA mean? 
 
A. That COA is high priority 
B. That COA is low priority 
C. That COA is not recommended at this time 
D. That COA has been chosen 
E. None of the above 
 
 
Hydraulic Seal Hot is only a problem when 
 
A. The gun commander is using high explosive rounds 
B. There is a green check mark next to a COA 
C. The gun mount also has a hydraulic seal leaking 
D. The other gun mount is incapacitated 
E. None of the above 
 
 
T   or   F    The recoil suppressor’s primary purpose is 
to ensure the accuracy of ERGM rounds. 
 
 
What does it mean if a gun problem is presented, but no 
COA’s are recommended? 
 
A. A gun problem exists, but there is not a target scheduled 
for this gun 
B. The NSFSA does not know how to prioritize the COA’s 
C. A gun problem exists making it impossible for the gun 
commander to follow the appropriate COA 
D. A gun problem exists and the other gun mount is 
incapacitated 
E. None of the above 
 
 
T   or    F You should not make a “Firing Complete 
Report” to the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) unless you 
have already decided on a recommendation. 
You are firing on a low priority, accuracy sensitive target 
with MT51. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem 
“Transducer damaged MT51.”  This is your only gun problem. 
MT52 is not currently firing on a target and is not 
scheduled to fire on a target for 5 minutes. 
 
How does “transducer damaged” affect the gun? 
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A.Causes the gun to get too hot 
B.Degrades the accuracy of the gun 
C. Slows the firing rate of the gun 
D. Renders the gun inoperable 
E. None of the above 
 
How might this problem impact the mission? 
 
A. May cause a hydraulic seal leak 
B. May cause start time sensitive targets to begin being 
fired on too late 
C. May require changes in scheduling of or rounds used for 
accuracy sensitive firing 
D. May cause the hydraulic seal to get hot 
E. None of the above 
 
 
In this situation, what would you do? 
 
A. Continue firing on the target, while being aware of 
other system conditions 
B. Cancel the target 
C. Switch to ERGM rounds 
D. Reallocate the target to MT52 
E. None of the above 
 
You are firing on a high priority, time sensitive target 
with MT51. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem “Recoil 
Damaged MT51.”  This is your only gun problem. MT52 is 
currently firing on another high priority, time sensitive 
target.  
 
How does “Recoil Damaged” affect the gun? 
 
A. Causes the gun to get too hot 
B. Degrades the accuracy of the gun 
C. Slows the firing rate of the gun 
D. Continued firing renders the gun inoperable 
E. None of the above 
 
 
How might this problem impact the mission? 
 
A. The mission schedule will likely be altered 
B. This will likely have no effect on the mission 
C. I will likely run low on ERGM rounds 
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D. I will likely run low on high explosive (HE) rounds 
E. None of the above 
 
 
In this situation, what would you do? 
 
A. Continue to fire MT51  
B. Reallocate the target to MT52 
C. Cancel the target allocated to MT51 
D. Cancel the mission 
E. None of the above 
 
 
You are firing on a low priority, time sensitive target 
(Target 4) with MT51. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun 
problem “Ammo Low MT51.” This is your only gun problem. 
MT51 is scheduled to begin firing on a high priority, time 
sensitive target (Target 6) immediately following Target 
four’s completion. MT52 is currently firing on a time 
sensitive, high priority target (Target 5) and has another 
time sensitive, high priority target (Target 7) scheduled 
immediately following completion. 
 
How does “Ammo Low” affect the gun? 
 
A. Causes the gun to get too hot 
B. Degrades the accuracy of the gun 
C. Slows the firing rate of the gun 
D. Continued firing renders the gun inoperable 
E. None of the above 
 
 
How might this impact the mission? 
 
A. May cause an inability to fire on accuracy sensitive 
targets 
B. May have to cancel some target(s) or fall behind 
schedule 
C. Will likely have to cancel mission 
D. Will likely have no impact on the mission 
E. None of the above 
 
 
In this situation, what would you do? 
 
A. Reallocate Target 4 to MT52 
B. Continue firing on Target 4 as scheduled 
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C. Reallocate MT51 to help with Target 5 
D. Cancel Target 4 
E. None of the above 
 
 
You are firing on a high priority, accuracy and time 
sensitive target with MT52. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun 
problem “Transducer damaged MT52.”  This is your only gun 
problem. MT51 is also currently firing on a high priority, 
accuracy and time sensitive target. 
 
How might this problem impact the mission? 
 
A. May cause a hydraulic seal leak 
B. May cause start time sensitive targets to begin being 
fired on too late 
C. May alter schedule or ammunition used for accuracy 
sensitive firing 
D. May cause the hydraulic seal to get hot 
E. None of the above 
 
 
In this situation, what would you do? 
 
A. Continue firing on the target, while being aware of 
other system conditions 
B. Cancel the target 
C. Switch to ERGM rounds 
D. Reallocate the target to MT51 
E. None of the above 
 
 
You are firing on a low priority time sensitive target with 
MT52 and on a high priority, accuracy sensitive target with 
MT51. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem, “Hydraulic 
Seal Hot MT52.”  This is your only gun problem. The next 
scheduled target for MT52 is in 2 min 30 sec. The next 
scheduled target for MT51 is in 4 min. 
 
How does the problem, “Hydraulic Seal Hot,” affect the gun? 
 
A. This degrades the accuracy of the gun 
B. This slows the rate of fire of the gun 
C. This makes a hydraulic seal leak more likely 
D. This renders the gun inoperable 




How might this impact the mission? 
 
A. May prevent the time sensitive target allocated to MT52 
from being completed 
B. May prevent the accuracy sensitive target allocated to 
MT51 from being completed 
C. No immediate impact, but will have to watch for a 
hydraulic seal leak 
D. May prevent firing of the next scheduled target for MT51 
E. None of the above 
 
 
In this situation, what would you do? 
 
A. Continue to fire on the target with MT52 
B. Cancel the mission 
C. Cancel the target allocated to MT52 
D. Switch MT52 to ERGM rounds 
E. None of the above 
 
  
You are firing on a low priority, time sensitive target 
with MT51.  The next scheduled target for MT51 is high 
priority. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem, 
“Hydraulic Seal Leak MT51.”  There are no targets currently 
scheduled to MT52. 
 
How does “Hydraulic Seal Leak” affect the gun? 
 
A. Causes the gun to get too hot 
B. Degrades the accuracy of the gun 
C. Slows the firing rate of the gun 
D. Causes the gun to require ERGM rounds 
E. None of the above 
 
 
How might this impact the mission? 
 
A. The mission schedule will likely be altered 
B. This will likely have no effect on the mission 
C. I will likely run low on ERGM rounds 
D. I will likely run low on high explosive (HE) rounds 
E. None of the above 
 
In this situation, what would you do? 
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A. Continue to fire MT51  
B. Reallocate the target to MT52 
C. Cancel the target allocated to MT51 
D. Switch to ERGM rounds 
E. None of the above 
 
 
You are firing on a low priority, time sensitive target 
(Target 9) with MT52. This is the last scheduled target for 
MT52.  The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem “Recoil 
Damaged MT52.”  This is your only gun problem. MT51 is 
currently firing on another high priority, time sensitive 
target. 
 
How might this problem impact the mission? 
 
A. It may not be possible to complete Target 9 
B. This may interfere with other targets allocated to MT52 
C. MT52 may need to be reallocated to another target 
D. I will likely run low on ammo 
E. None of the above 
 
 
In this situation, what would you do? 
 
A. Reallocate Target 9 to MT51 
B. Cancel Target 9 
C. Switch to ERGM rounds 
D. Continue firing on Target 9 as scheduled 
E. None of the above 
 
 
You are firing on a high priority, time sensitive target 
(Target 5) with MT51 and on a high priority, time sensitive 
target (Target 6) for MT52. On Jane’s Fleet Command, you 
see that friendly troops have just moved close to Target 6. 
The NSFSA alerts you to the following problems:  “Ammo Low 
MT51,” and “Transducer Damaged MT52.”  You have no other 
gun problems. 
 
How might these problems affect the mission? 
 
A. It is likely that these problems will have no impact on 
the mission 
B. It is likely that a hydraulic seal will get hot 
C. It is likely that a hydraulic seal will get hot and leak 
D. It is likely that both guns will become inoperable 
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E. None of the above 
 
 
In this situation, what would you do? 
 
A. Cancel Target 5 and switch to ERGM rounds for MT52 
B. Switch to ERGM rounds for MT52 and continue firing MT51 
on Target 5 
C. Reallocate MT52 to Target 5 and cancel Target 6 
D. Reallocate MT51 to Target 6 and MT52 to Target 5 
None of the above 
 
 
You are firing on a high priority target (Target 3) with 
MT52. This target is not time sensitive. The NSFSA alerts 
you to the following gun problems: “Hydraulic Seal Hot 
MT52,” and “Hydraulic Seal Leak MT52.” There are no other 
gun problems. MT51 is currently firing on a high priority, 
time sensitive target, but has no targets scheduled after 
its completion. 
 
How might these problems affect the mission? 
 
A. It is likely that these problems will have no impact on 
the mission 
B. It is likely that it will not be possible to fire on an 
accuracy sensitive target 
C. It is likely that MT52 will run out of ERGM rounds 
D. It is likely that both guns will become inoperable 
E. None of the above 
 
 
In this situation, what would you do? 
 
A. Reallocate Target 3 to MT51 
B. Continue firing on Target 3 with MT52 
C. Cancel Target 3 
D. Reallocate Target 3 to MT51 and Target 4 to MT52 
E. None of the above 
 
 
18. T  or   F  All gun problems should be reported to the 
TAO 
 
19. T  or  F   A hydraulic seal that gets hot very early 




20. T  or  F Transducer damage degrades the accuracy of a 
gun 
 
T  or  F Recoil damage is not a serious gun problems 
 
21. T  or  F A leaking hydraulic seal degrades the 
accuracy of the gun 
 
22. T  or  F Unless it leads to other problems, a hot 
hydraulic seal has no affect on the gun 
 
T  or  F As ammo becomes low, the maximum firing rate of 





APPENDIX E: NSFSA KNOWLEDGE PRE-TEST 
 82
NSFSA PRETEST RUN # ______________ 
 
 
THERE MAY BE MORE THAN ONE CORRECT ANSWER. 
 
1. What can you assume with the gun problem Transducer Damaged? 
 
 A. The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired. 
 B. This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target. 
 C. This gun can be fired unless it also has a hydraulic seal hot.   
 D. Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage. 
 E. None of the above. 
 
 
2. What can you assume with the gun problem Hydraulic Seal Leaking? 
 
 A. The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired. 
 B. This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target. 
 C. This gun can be fired unless it also has a recoil suppressor damaged.   
 D. Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage. 
 E. None of the above. 
 
 
3. What can you assume with the gun problem Ammo Low? 
 
 A. The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired. 
 B. This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target. 
 C. This gun can be fired unless it also has a hydraulic seal leaking.   
 D. Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage. 
 E. None of the above. 
 
 
4. What can you assume with the gun problem Recoil Damage? 
 
 A. The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired. 
 B. This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target. 
 C. This gun can be fired unless it also has a transducer damaged.   
 D. Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage. 
 E. None of the above. 
 
 
5. What can you assume with the gun problem Hydraulic Seal Hot? 
 
 A. The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired. 
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 B. This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target. 
 C. This gun can be fired unless it also has a hydraulic seal leaking.   
 D. Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage. 
 E. None of the above. 
 
 
6. How high can we expect projectiles to go in today’s gun shoot?   
 
 A. 33,000’ 
 B. 18,000’ 
 C. 16,500’ 
 D. 1,500’ 
 E. 12,000’ 
 
 
7. What is the advantage of using High Explosive (HE) projectiles? 
 
 A. They make a bigger bang than ERGM. 
 B. There are lots of them onboard. 
 C. They cost less than some other rounds. 
 D. They are easier to shoot. 
 E. None of the above. 
 
 
8. What is the advantage of using Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM)?   
 
 A. They make a bigger bang than HE rounds. 
 B. There are lots of them onboard. 
 C. They cost less than some other rounds. 
 D. They are easier to shoot. 
 E. None of the above. 
 
 
9. What can you assume with friendly forces in the area of a scheduled target? 
 
 A. The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired. 
 B. The gun shooting this target can not have a Transducer Damaged problem. 
 C. Friendly forces will not be so close to the target that they will be in danger. 
 D. Regardless of the target category selected, the target is also accuracy sensitive. 
E. None of the above. 
 
 
10. When should situation reports be made to the TAO?  
 
 A. When you have a gun problem. 
 B. When contacts near the battle space first appear or become a threat to safety. 
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C. When messages are received that may effect the gunfire mission. 
D. When firing on scheduled targets is complete. 
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Note:  “Feedback” pertains to the information given by the NSFSA in support of the 
recommended course of action (COA). 
 
1. How well do you feel you performed the task? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not well 
at all 




2. How satisfied were you with the training experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
satisfied 
     Very 
satisfied 
 
3. How well did you feel you understood what you were doing? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not well 
at all 
     Extremely 
well 
 
4. How much did the feedback provided by the NSFSA help you to perform the 
scenario? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very 
much 
 
5. How confident are you in the ability of the NSFSA to recommend the most 
appropriate course of action (COA)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
confident 





6. How much did the feedback you were provided by NSFSA help you to make a 
decision on which course of action to choose? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very 
much 
 
7. Overall, how much did the feedback provided by the NSFSA help you to perform the 
scenario? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very 
much 
 
8. How well did the feedback help you to understand why each gun casualty was a 
problem? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




9. How well did the feedback help you to understand the impact of gun problems on the 
mission? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




10. How satisfied were you with the feedback given as to why each recommendation was 
made? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
satisfied 
     Very 
satisfied 
 
11. Did the feedback given by the NSFSA help you to determine whether to accept the 
recommendation?  
 




12. Overall, how easy was it to understand the feedback given by the NSFSA? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
difficult 
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Age______        Gender _______ 
 
Describe your education:  
 





Highest Degree Held? 
 
High School Diploma    Associates Degree        
Bachelors Degree 
 
Are you currently or have you ever been enrolled in the 
military? 
 




Which branch? _______________      Rank:_______________ 
 










Circle the statement that best applies to you 
 
What’s a   Never use  Sometimes use Frequently use 
computer?  computers     computers   computers 
 
 
How often do you play video games? 
 





Please circle the computer applications that you use 
 
Video games                      E-mail                      
Internet       
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TAO, GUNS 
I HAVE A _________(SURFACE OR AIR) _____CONTACT 
TO THE ____(NORTH, SOUTH, SOUTHWEST, ETC.)____ 
HEADED TOWARD THE __(NORTH, SOUTH, SOUTHWEST, ETC.)__ 
SPEED ____________ KNOTS 
ALTITUDE ________ FEET 




APPENDIX I: GUN CASUALTY REPORT TEMPLATE 
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TAO, GUNS 
I HAVE A ____(GUN CASUALTY )______ ON MOUNT ___(51 OR 52). 
THIS __(IS/IS NOT)__ A PROBLEM FOR US NOW BECAUSE:________________. 









Time MT Gun Casualty Det Diag Prog Comp
95 MT51 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT     
97 MT52 TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED     
276 MT52 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT     
306 MT51 AMMO_LOW     
515 MT52 RECOIL_DAMAGED     
517 MT51 RECOIL_DAMAGED     
756 MT51 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_LEAKING     
757 MT52 AMMO_LOW     
995 MT51 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT     
997 MT52 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT     
1235 MT51 TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED     
1236 MT52 AMMO_LOW     
1475 MT51 TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED     
1476 MT52 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT     
1715 MT51 AMMO_LOW     
1716 MT52 TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED     
1955 MT51 TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED     
1956 MT52 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT     
2195 MT51 TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED     
2196 MT52 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_LEAKING     
2437 MT51 RECOIL_DAMAGED     
2438 MT52 TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED     
2676 MT51 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_LEAKING     
2677 MT52 HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT     
2915 MT51 TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED     
2916 MT52 AMMO_LOW     
3155 MT51 TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED     
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